Introduction
What justifies the judicial review of administrative action and how should such proposes a theory of deference as respect when it comes to the application of the grounds of review of administrative action by the courts.
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Dyzenhaus' list of publications is impressive and covers a vast range of topics.
The focus in this article is on his texts from around 1990, with the emphasis on his texts published since the late 1990s. This article can obviously not do complete justice to all the nuances of his thought. I hope that it is nevertheless accurate enough to give a fair account of his thinking insofar as it relates specifically to the judicial review of administrative action. 3 In this article I will provide a summary and an evaluation, first of Dyzenhaus' theory of democracy, and then of his proposed approach to judicial review. My evaluation of Dyzenhaus' views on democracy and judicial review will proceed through reliance on some of the texts of Jacques Derrida, specifically those that relate to justice, democracy and the gift. The aim of this discussion will be to seek answers to the questions referred to above that plague administrative law.
Dyzenhaus' views on democracy and judicial review

A theory of democracy
The debate between proponents of the ultra vires doctrine and those who believe that the common law provides the justification for judicial review has mostly taken place from the perspective of legal positivism. 4 Dyzenhaus contends that the debate suffers from an empty formalism and, furthermore, that both sides of the debate agree that judicial review is legitimate as well as on the values which should guide such review. 5 The problems that Dyzenhaus 3 Van der Walt and Botha 2000 Constellations 341 have criticised Dyzenhaus from a perspective similar to the one adopted here. The focus of that criticism was, however, only of Dyzenhaus 1998 SAJHR 11 and did not relate specifically to Dyzenhaus' views on the judicial review of administrative action. 4 Dyzenhaus Form and Substance 145. 5
Dyzenhaus 2002 NZLR 528. Dyzenhaus Justice of the Common Law 33 furthermore argues that the ultra vires doctrine cannot -because of its emphasis on legally constituted powers -justify the development of a duty of fairness, the imposition of standards of reasonableness, or the intervention of the courts in the face of an ouster clause. The problems with the common law approach include that it adopts the view that legislative intent is irrelevant to justifying review, whilst acknowledging that judges cannot ignore legislation which clearly excludes the application of certain common law values, implying thereby that judicial review depends upon and is justified by parliament's silence; Dyzenhaus 2002 NZLR 538. 4/48 of reflection". 10 Judicial decisions and the common law did not, according to
Bentham, qualify as law. Only legislation enacted by parliament, reflecting the preferences of the majority, would so qualify. Democracy would thus make possible …the happiness of the greatest number by reflecting as faithfully as possible the desires of the political community as a whole.
11
Legislation, furthermore, had to be drafted in the clearest way possible, so as to prevent any ambiguities from arising and to allow for judicial deference to the will of the legislature. Bentham was critical of the common law and the practice of judges to find ambiguities in statutes and thereby imposing their views of right and wrong on the legislature. Judicial decisions were to have force only as between the parties before the court. Bentham was willing to allow the judiciary to find that a law is unjust and to not apply it to the parties before him, without this, however, affecting the validity of the law. A legislative committee would simply be informed of the problem detected by the judge. To give judges the power to invalidate legislation would be undemocratic and contrary to the culture of reflection as it would mean that judges could interfere with the preferences of the majority. 12 Bentham, furthermore, did not have a substantive theory of justice as Dworkin, for example, has. Bentham, Dyzenhaus points out, wished for substantive principles of justice to emerge through the democratic process. 13 Dyzenhaus agrees with Bentham's idea of legitimacy deriving from the people and, therefore, on the central role of the legislature. He is, however, critical of Bentham's views in relation to the role of the judiciary. Bentham's . Dyzenhaus Justice of the Common Law 36-37 finds a contemporary version of this conception of legal culture in the work of the "Antipodean positivists", Jeffrey Goldsworthy and Jeremy Waldron. The culture of reflection is "most strongly articulated in the codified European legal orders", Dyzenhaus says (at 38). 11 Dyzenhaus 1996 ARSP 346. Democracy and positive law, Dyzenhaus argues (at 346-347) , are purely instrumental in Bentham's model as they are regarded as the best ways of realising a culture of reflection: "Democracy is the best available mechanism for revealing preferences and positive law the best available mechanism for implementing them. If other superior mechanisms were available, they should be adopted." 12 Ibid 346, 348. 13 See Dyzenhaus Form and Substance 157; Dyzenhaus 1996 ARSP 343-344; Dyzenhaus 1998 SAJHR 33; Recrafting the Rule of Law 2-3, 6; Dyzenhaus Politics of Deference 280.
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5/48 theory of democracy is deficient, he says, for not allowing any control over the determination of what law is.
14 In developing a model which addresses the latter criticism, Dyzenhaus draws from what he terms "a culture of neutrality", as reflected in Dworkin's theory of the rule of law. 15 In a culture of neutrality, law is used to keep certain principles safe from democracy. 16 Dyzenhaus has a number of problems with Dworkin's theory which are of relevance to judicial review. His first disagreement is with Dworkin's idea of judicial supremacism, 17 which is tied to his formal doctrine of separation of powers. 18 Applied to administrative law, this idea would effectively mean that judges would have the final say with regard to all interpretive issues (both procedural and substantive) in reviewing administrative action. 19 The imperialism of principles in Dworkin's model furthermore creates the opportunity for judges to apply private law principles in the public law context. 20 Because of the distinction between policy and principle, judges are also likely to leave an unfettered discretion to administrative bodies when a matter is regarded as one of policy. 21 Dyzenhaus nevertheless does not completely reject the idea of principles which animate the legal order, as he believes (with Mureinik and Fuller) that there are certain coherent principles (present in the common law of administrative law) which are fundamental to both legal and political order because they are essential elements of democracy. 22 Dyzenhaus points out that in South Africa under apartheid, Mureinik argued that the legislature, in the absence of clear indications to the contrary, should be taken to have wished for certain fundamental principles to be protected. The legislature should thus be assumed by the courts to have acted coherently with the aspirations of the rule of law by complying with certain (legal and moral) 14 Dyzenhaus 1998 SAJHR 34; Dyzenhaus Form and Substance 170-171 " [T] o the extent that a government is unwilling to make its desire to be unconstrained by the rule of law entirely explicit, judges are given toeholds in the law to impose rule of law constraints, if they are minded to do so. That is, since such judges operate on the assumption that government under the rule of law aspires to realize the values of the common law model, they will interpret legislation on the basis that it shares that aspiration unless they are forced by very explicit language to abandon that assumption. Diceyan approaches adopted by the courts in terms of which either all questions of law have been regarded as jurisdictional and therefore subject to judicial control (thus leaving no room for deference to administrative decisionmaking) or where a distinction was made between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional issues (the latter being seen as a realm of politics (arbitrariness) and, therefore, beyond legal control). 66 Underlying this approach is a deep antagonism to statute law and to the administrative state as interfering with the private order of the common law. 67 Dyzenhaus argues that by recognising the inherent or potential rationality of administrative decision-making, a limit is at the same time laid down, entitling the courts to interfere whenever the decision does not meet the standard of rationality. A standard of rationality, however, creates a risk that judges will simply impose judicial standards of rationality on the administration. 68 In other words, judges could use the language of reasonableness although they were ultimately judging the correctness of the whether a decision is justifiable is also different from asking whether a decision is justified. In the latter event the question would be similar to a standard of correctness, namely whether the decision coincides with the decision which the judge would have given herself.
74
The requirement of "adequate justification" entails an approach of deference to the decisions of administrative authorities, but then a specific kind of deference which Dyzenhaus describes as "deference as respect":
Deference as respect requires not submission, but a respectful attention to the reasons offered or which could be offered in support of a decision, whether that decision be the statutory decision of the The fundamental values of the common law are said to express the notion of an "ideal legal order", an "inspirational ideal" or an ideal of justice, and these values are said to not have been "created" or "legislated" at any particular moment in time. 101 Dyzenhaus also refers to his view on the relationship between law and justice/morality as a conception of the rule of law which involves the enforcement of an "internal morality of law". 102 The understanding (droit) that doesn't imply in itself, a priori, in the analytic structure of the concept, the possibility of being 'enforced', applied by force. There are, to be sure, laws that are not enforced, but there is no law without enforceability and no applicability or enforceability of the law without force, whether this force be direct or indirect, physical or symbolic, exterior or interior, brutal or subtly discursive and hermeneutic, coercive or regulative, and so forth". 120 Ibid 17, 22. 121 Ibid 10-11, 22. As Derrida 1999 South African Journal of Philosophy 284 has explained in an interview: "When I said that there is a difference, a heterogeneity between justice and law, I would add this point, which I think is decisive: this distinction is not a distinction between two terms, between two poles, as if we had on one side justice, and on the other side law. No, they are two, but they are one. It is impossible to think justice without including in it the injunction to determine justice by the law, that is, to produce just laws. These two poles are infinitely heterogeneous, but the law must be inspired by justice, it is part of its concept, and justice must command the production of determined laws. Identifying the other beforehand would detract from her otherness and turn her into "the same". To avoid this, the "approach" that is proposed here is closely tied to language and the concepts we use in (administrative) law, such as responsibility, decision, democracy, equality, dignity, freedom and justice. The proposed approach entails the questioning and analysis of these concepts, thereby opening administrative law to the future, a future which must be "more just". "The other" should thus be understood as not necessarily a person or an applicant for review, but as the new arrivant: that which or who arrives unexpectedly and demands justice. The proposed approach, insofar as it speaks of "the other", should thus be understood as one of hospitality toward the event of the coming; see Derrida Aporias 33-34. The proposed approach is aligned with a left politics, but as will appear in what follows, it seeks to go beyond the limits of politics. 124 "Is" is under erasure because différance never presents itself as such; Derrida Speech and Phenomena 134. 125 Ibid 130, 134. 126 The "a" in différance points to the simultaneously active and passive "generative movement in the play of differences"; Derrida Positions 24. Différance is not simply active because it is not set in motion by an agent or a subject, yet it is not simply passive; Derrida Speech and Phenomena 137. 127 Saussure pointed out that the language system has no positive terms, but that it is simply and only made up of differences. 128 See, e.g., the interview with Levinas in Mortley French Philosophers 16-17: "When I talk about responsibility and obligation, and consequently about the person with whom one is words, Dyzenhaus' model of review seeks to protect the law and thus also the community that law seeks to protect, from that which makes it possible: justice, the excess of the un-economic; it seeks to place limits on the infinite responsibility that is owed to the other; it is an attempt to erect a barricade against the future. 133 It is, therefore, not simply an "inner morality" that is inscribed in law as contended by Dyzenhaus, but a promise of incalculable justice; a justice which calls for revolutionary change, not simply the slow evolution of the values of liberal democracy.
134
A judge is typically caught in an aporia, a double bind. She has to do justice which, as we saw above, has to do with singularity and incalculability and she in a relationship through the face, this person does not appear as belonging to an order which can be 'embraced' or 'grasped' [in the way in which objects and things can be grasped]. The other, in this relationship of responsibility, is, as it were, unique: 'unique' meaning without genre. In this sense he is absolutely other, not only in relation to me; he is alone as if he were the only one of significance in that moment. The essence of responsibility lies in the uniqueness of the person for whom you are responsible…. Furthermore, the 'I' which finds itself with this responsibility cannot be replaced. Consequently, within this exceptional relationship between me and the other, he who is responsible is the chosen one. It's the uniqueness of the elect. So, apart from what we called mind at the beginning, the mind which knows and embraces, which invests, which possesses, uses, which takes, understands -all this activity of the mind is in complete contrast to the idea of the self which is passive, under obligation and unique. 
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The pure gift, if it exists, would be a gift that does not appear as such: where X gives without knowing that she is giving (and thus cannot feel generous) and Y receiving without knowing that she is receiving a gift (and thus not being able to feel grateful). As opposed to the traditional and logical understanding of the gift as related to subjectivity, intention, and agency, the pure gift calls for an absence of subjectivity, intention and agency. 152 The gift calls for the impossible: 153 a gift which would not obey the principle of reason; 154 a gift which would interrupt the circular economy. As subjects, we (similar to Abraham, as we will see below), are caught in this paradox of the gift. On the one hand, we are caught in the circle, the economy of gift-giving and on the other, there is the desire to give the pure gift. Law and justice understood in terms of Derrida's analysis of the gift, shows the self-serving tendency of law. It shows law's underlying economic structure. A constitutional decision in the name of a community, seeks, one can say, …through the gesture of the gift to constitute its own unity and, precisely, to get its own identity recognized so that that identity comes back to it, so that it can reappropriate its identity: as its property.
155
The rule of law (even if understood in a non-positivist, democratic, proceduralist way) establishes an economy of exchange, a restricted, self-serving 152 Derrida ibid 101 says that the "very idea" of the subject is someone who "never give [s] anything without calculating, consciously or unconsciously, its reappropriation, its exchange, or its circular return -and by definition this means reappropriation with surplusvalue, a certain capitalization". 153 Derrida To Forgive 28 similarly says regarding forgiveness that "there is in forgiveness, in the very meaning of forgiveness a force, a desire, an impetus, a movement, an appeal…that demands that forgiveness be granted, if it can be, even to someone who does not ask for it, who does not repent or confess or improve or redeem himself, beyond, consequently, an entire identificatory, spiritual, whether sublime or not, economy, beyond all expiation even." 154 Derrida Given Time 156: "The gift would be that which does not obey the principle of reason: It is, it ought to be, it owes itself to be without reason, without wherefore and without foundation. The gift, if there is any, does not even belong to practical reason. It should remain a stranger to morality, to the will, perhaps to freedom, at least to that freedom that is associated with the will of the subject. It should remain a stranger to the law or to the "il faut" (you must, you have to) of this practical reason." 155 Ibid 11 (see also at 53-54 on giving).
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economy.
156 Law as such (without allowing for its interruption by the other, without incalculable justice) lays down an encircling horizon of possibility which walls us in and cuts off the impossible. Duty or responsibility binds me to the other, to the other as other, and ties me in my absolute responsibility to the other as other…. As soon as I enter into a relation with the absolute other, my absolute singularity enters into relation with his on the level of obligation and duty. I am responsible to the other as other, I answer to him and I answer for what I do before him.
165
I also cannot know or understand the other. The other is inaccessible to me, as secret and transcendent as God. 166 Therefore, when asked by Isaac about the lamb for sacrifice, Abraham responds without responding (he keeps the secret -the silent "a" in différance). 167 Derrida contrasts this with common sense, the common sense that we can also see in Dyzenhaus' notion of justifiability: 
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For common sense, just as for philosophical reasoning, the most widely shared belief is that responsibility is tied to the public and to the non-secret, to the possibility and even the necessity of accounting for one's words and actions in front of others, of justifying and owning up to them. Here, on the contrary it appears, just as necessarily, that the absolute responsibility of my actions, to the extent that such a responsibility remains mine, singularly so, something no one else can perform in my place, instead implies secrecy. But what is also implied is that, by not speaking to others, I don't account for my actions, that I answer for nothing [que je ne réponde de rien] and to no one, that I make no response to others or before others.
168
Abraham's responsibility towards the other is such that it is not guided by reason or an ethics that would be justifiable to others or a universal law. 169 What is required in the unique and singular encounter with the other is thus not first of all, justification, but secrecy. Responding to the needs of others and balancing the interests of the other with those of others through the law or with reference to legal values (responsibility in general), incites us to self-justification and, therefore, to irresponsibility in relation to our absolute responsibility. 
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decision: it cannot be deduced from a form of knowledge of which it would simply be the effect, conclusion or explication. It structurally breaches knowledge and is thus destined to non-manifestation; a decision is, in the end, always secret.
180
Abraham is the perfect example, it seems, 181 of what it means to be responsible for the other. To heed the call of justice we have to experience the abyss or the "open mouth" (with all its connotations) 182 of incalculable justice. To be responsible, we have to take leave of our own subjectivity as well as of the shared subjectivity of "our community". We have to act without any thought of the consequences to ourselves and "our community". Irrespective of how progressive Dyzenhaus' model of review is, we cannot follow him completely if we have a true concern for justice. His model does not allow for any disruption of common norms, standards of rationality or of (communal) subjectivity.
Dyzenhaus would have us judge the other without any concern for the uninterrupted (although more welcoming, hospitable) collective narcissism which is legalised by his conception of justice. 
Judicial review as giving the perfect gift
The akedah and the analyses of the concepts of the gift and of justice above are of relevance for constitutional decisions, including decisions reviewing administrative action. They illustrate not only the infinite demand that justice places on a judge in the singular case, but also that judges have no choice but to place limitations on that duty in the interests of the preservation of law.
Dyzenhaus' texts clearly show a concern for justice. This concern is, however, for a limited justice that ultimately serves the needs of a particular community.
Dyzenhaus' concern is expressed in the language of reasonableness and the values of the rule of law, which inevitably means that justice will be reduced to "our" justice. The other will be judged not as other, but reduced to the same: in The law that reason obeys is reason's own law, so it does not, ultimately, finally bend its knee to anything "other" (heteros) but offers its respects to itself (autos), like a man bowing to himself in the mirror. Even when it honors the Other as an end in itself, it does so in virtue of the Law, which is Reason, which is itself; so it respects itself as an end in itself.
186
The notions of reason and justification that Dyzenhaus employs thus inevitably imply the postulation of …a universal community of beings who are similar if not identical in reason and inclination with the ego.
187
The gift that justice is supposed to be is turned into poison: 188 You may receive the gift of "justice" as long as your arguments fit into "our" notions of reasonableness. 
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Western democracies today profess to have a concern with justice, profess also, through the existence of the institution of judicial review, that all their public acts are justifiable or at least required to be such. What Abraham was prepared to do (to commit murder), would have no place in or would be rightly condemned in such democracies. 189 The question Derrida, however, raises is whether we (especially those of us -and I do not exclude myself -who live in
Western-style liberal democracies with relative ease and comfort) are not all complicit in murder "on all the Mount Moriahs of this world" 190 every day in spite of living in a culture of justification. As Derrida points out, these "civilized societies", through the structures of the laws of the market, as well as through mechanisms of external debt and other such inequitiesputs to death or (but failing to help someone in distress accounts for only a minor difference) allows to die of hunger and disease tens of millions of children (those neighbours or fellow humans that ethics or the discourse of the rights of man refer to) without any moral or legal tribunal ever being considered competent to judge such a sacrifice, the sacrifice of others to avoid being sacrificed oneself. Not only is it true that such a society participates in this incalculable sacrifice, it actually organizes it. The smooth functioning of its economic, political, and legal affairs, the smooth functioning of its moral discourse and good conscience presupposes the permanent operation of this sacrifice. espouses. The judiciary also inevitably has to be aware, in exercising its review jurisdiction, of its "proper" place within a democratic dispensation. It has to respect the autonomy of administrative bodies which were tasked by a democratic legislature to design or implement policy. Dyzenhaus' notion of "deference as respect" gives expression to these important ideas.
This article, nevertheless, calls for a different understanding of the abovementioned aspects of Dyzenhaus' model of review, for the recognition that they are inscribed within the logic of différance. Dyzenhaus' model, in other words, requires refinement. If we have a concern for justice and democracy in administrative law, Dyzenhaus' model must be so re-inscribed. It would be irresponsible and indeed unjustifiable for a model of review to be called "democratic" (with its connotations of justice, whether procedural/substantive or both) if it does not seek to urgently address the plight of millions of human beings who are effectively homeless and who suffer and die from malnutrition and disease, despite the fact that the "administrative" capacity (the technology and resources) exists in "established democracies" to eliminate these. A model of review which calls itself democratic must similarly enable a vigorous resistance to or at least constraining of the implementation of privatisation, 38/48 deregulation, outsourcing and downsizing insofar as these measures have an effect on equality and dignity. 221 It would be irresponsible and unjustifiable to, when those affected by such measures approach the courts on review, judge their pleas simply with reference to "our" democratic values and "our" ideas as to the "proper" role of the judiciary in review proceedings in a "democracy".
Responsibility requires of us to understand justice as incalculable justice, as a justice without being limited to values; to understand equality as without limits;
to understand democracy as always deferred, postponed, put off, and thus remaining "to come". 
